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The Paradox of Imprecision: Wittgenstein, Quine, and the Limits of Exactness in Language

By Henry Bauer

Introduction

This paper is a technical investigation of a phenomenon that I call “efficient imprecision” in
language, which Ludwig Wittgenstein famously took on in the first part of Philosophical Investigations.
Basically, an expression or term that exhibits what I call “efficient imprecision” is one which ordinary
language users employ with near-infallibility, but for which they are unable, in practice or in principle, to
readily provide a precise definition. First I will develop a notion of precision relative to a given language.
Following this, several different examples will be discussed, each revealing a different aspect of the
phenomenon. One type of example consists of words like “game”, which, as Wittgenstein argued, we
understand in an inexact way, since we cannot provide a definition of games that covers every attested use
of the term. The other type involves words that are characterized by “semantic poverty”, such as emphatic
particles. These words, I argue, seem intuitively to have a meaning, but we don’t seem to be able to define
them in relation to either extensional properties, i.e. those having to do with referring to objects, or
intensional properties, i.e. those having to do with the internal content of an expression. This is what I call
the paradox of imprecision in language: fluent speakers of a language use both semantically vague and
semantically poor expressions in recognizably systematic ways, but we can’t seem to define what they
mean. In conclusion, I attempt to state concisely what I consider to be a more intuitive view of how
language works in general that explains this apparent paradox.

Background: Wittgenstein

Some background: Ludwig Wittgenstein was an Austrian-born philosopher based at Cambridge
for most of his life. His first published work, titled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, made him a central
figure in the logical positivist school of philosophy of language, which was centered around the idea that
natural language should be replaced with something more precise if philosophy is going to make progress.
In the 1930s, however, Wittgenstein began to develop radically different views of language from those he
had expressed in the Tractatus. In his Philosophical Investigations, published in 1953 after his death, he
argues in many different ways for the primacy of the social function of language, and for his belief that
philosophical problems are illusory, based on a failure to understand the workings of our ordinary
language. He uses the example of the word “game” to show that we don’t necessarily need to have an
artificially regimented definition of a word in order to use it. This is what I call the phenomenon of
efficient imprecision.
Perhaps the first philosopher to engage with the problem of efficient imprecision was St.
Augustine, who, in contemplating the mystery of time, said, “quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me
quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”1. In fact, Wittgenstein includes this very quotation in
the part of Philosophical Investigations where he famously considers our (allegedly) imprecise
understanding of the word “game”:

69. How should we describe to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe games to him,
and we might add: “This and similar things are called ‘games’”. And do we know any more about it
ourselves?...We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn...we can draw a boundary--for
a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?...No more than it took the definition: 1
pace = 75 cm. To make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. And if you want to stay “But still, before
that it wasn’t an exact measure”, then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.--Though you still owe me a
definition of exactness.2

Wittgenstein has observed that a language user does not need to be readily able to retrieve a
precise definition of a term from the regimented area of his or her language in order to use the word, and
consequently the concept, with fluency.
He also remarks that a definition of linguistic precision is still wanting. Wittgenstein’s Tractarian
conception of a logically ideal and precise language was founded on his logical atomism, which depended
on the ability to analyze statements about complexes into statements about simples. Wittgenstein states
elsewhere in the Investigations that what he called “objects” in his Tractarian period were to be
considered “primary elements”, “simple constituent parts of which reality is composed”; however, in the
Investigations, Wittgenstein shows that the compositeness or simpleness of a thing is always intuited
relative to a particular context and a particular language:

If I tell someone without any further explanation: “What I see before me now is composite”, he will have
the right to ask: “What do you mean by ‘composite’? For there are all sorts of things that that can
mean!”--The question “Is what you see composite?” makes good sense if it is already established what kind
of complexity--that is, which particular use of the word--is in question.

It is clear, therefore, that we will not attain a notion of exactness that generalizes across linguistic
contexts. However, a notion of language-relative exactness remains theoretically available. This is what I
will attempt to develop in the next section.

A notion of language-relative precision

An expression or term that meets our criteria of language-relative precision I will call L-precise.
We are going to end up saying, roughly, that an expression is L-precise if its usage would be amenable to
possible regimentation, and that an expression is efficiently imprecise if language users employ it
practically infallibly, but its usage is not amenable to possible regimentation. It is important to keep in
mind that a notion of precision relative to a given language will have to be essentially behavioristic,
because if we look beyond the ways in which a term is used to some theoretical “essential meaning” of
the term, we will be talking about a concept that is presumably not confined to one given language, but
potentially common to all. This is a subtle but important distinction. We want to think of a precise
definition as documenting, and enforcing conformity with, established usage, not of accessing some
underlying “essential quality” of an expression.
A word unanalyzed is neither precise nor imprecise; it is either effective or ineffective upon a
particular occasion of its use. Our inquiry is not about how we use language, but about how we
understand our use of language. Therefore, it is the form of the definition given for a term that renders it
precise or imprecise. But we need to be careful here, because considering definitions as having influence
on a word or expression’s meaning leads us to the threshold of the major criticisms of the notion of
analyticity, or truth by dint of linguistic facts alone, advanced by W.V. Quine in his seminal 1951 paper
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine forcefully attacks the intelligibility of any proposed general
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, because the notion of analyticity to be explained is
founded on the also unexplained notion of synonymy. Quine explains the connection between analyticity
and definitions, and shows the problems that arise in thinking about analyticity , in section II:

There are those who...say that the...analytic statements reduce to...logical truths, by definition; ‘bachelor’,
e.g., is defined as ‘unmarried man’. But how do we find that ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’?
Who defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the nearest dictionary, and accept the lexicographer’s
formulation as law?...The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording of

antecedent facts; and if he glosses ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’ it is because of his belief that there is a
relation of synonymy between these forms, implicit in general or preferred usage prior to his own
work...Certainly the “definition” which is the lexicographer’s report of an observed synonymy cannot be
taken as the ground of synonymy.3

The key here, however, is that a definition that renders a term L-precise does not purport to
express an analytic truth, but merely to place a limit on usage. When we assert that “X is used in the
context of signifying (x1, x2, x3...xi)” is a definition rendering the term X L-precise, we do not assert that
statements relating X to any or all of the xi’s are necessarily or a priori true, and advance this definition as
explaining their truth, but merely attempt to exhaustively report, or, in different contexts, stipulate, the
possible significations of X. The definition does not have to be construed as explaining the meaning of X,
but only as rendering it precise. Indeed, since a language-relative notion of precision requires a
framework of behaviorism, the “explanation” of the meaning of X comes to an end at this delimitation of
possible usage. Our notion of L-precision, therefore, is valid even if the intelligibility of the
analytic-synthetic distinction is denied, and can be incorporated into a framework of strict linguistic
behaviorism,
Quine also gives “a brief appraisal of the role of definition in formal work”; the conception of
definition he suggests has some similarities to our notion of an L-precise definition. Quine argues that the
so-called definitions which appear in formalized systems are best viewed not as definitions at all, but as
“rules of translation” between two languages: an “inclusive language” with distinctive notations for a
wealth of concepts, and a language with minimal conceptual commitments which contains the “primitive
notation”. In his words, “[w]hole and part are correlated by rules of translation whereby each idiom not in
primitive notation is equated to some complex built up of primitive notation.” One could think of a
definition capable of rendering a term or expression L-precise as a correlating rule of translation between
the definiendum which is under examination and the definientia which, if successful, are composed of

terms and expressions with which we are intimately acquainted and already use fluently. On our analogy,
the definienda come from the “inclusive language”, and the definientia belong to the language of
“primitive notation”.
An example will make it clear what I’ve been talking about. Consider the following two
definitions of model theory, a topic in mathematical logic:
1) Model theory = universal algebra + logic.
2) Model theory is a topic in mathematical logic.
Definition 1) is from Chang & Keisler’s book on model theory. The Chang and Keisler definition
is an example of a definition that renders its definiendum precise, or L-precise. For a mathematician and
logician who was deeply knowledgeable of universal algebra and logic, but for some reason had never
heard of model theory as such, could theoretically, from this definition, invent the entire field of model
theory, and subsequently apply the term “model theory” to the field he had invented. Its usage has become
precise. Whereas it is harder to see, on this view, how someone could do the same thing with definition
2). This definition of the term “model theory” does not appear to completely encompass and precisely
delimit its observed usage; and the difference between a definition that renders some usage of a term
precise and one that does not appears to be whether, given a definition, a language user could
independently and exhaustively conceptualize the term’s signification as revealed in its usage. Given the
definition 2), we are unable to exhaustively conceptualize model theory in order to differentiate it from,
say, proof theory (another topic in mathematical logic), and I don’t think we can call that giving an exact
boundary to our use of the term. Perhaps 2) does not intuitively seem to be a definition. This, I believe, is
because we ordinarily use the word “definition” to mean a definition that renders the term as precise as
possible, and this shows that the distinction we have drawn between terms that are L-precise and terms
that are not comports to some degree with a certain intuition that we already have about how language
works.

This is a strong requirement for precision; however, it is coherent enough for us to work with.
You may be thinking at this point that there are rather few terms and expressions in natural language that
will measure up to this requirement; and I would say that you are right. As I said in the introduction to
this paper, I see the phenomenon of efficient imprecision as being quite common in our ordinary language
and in some sense constitutive of the difference between natural and formal language.

Examples of efficient imprecision

Now let’s look at some examples of the phenomenon that I have been calling “efficient
imprecision”. The examples we will consider will be broadly of two types: one type, which corresponds
more or less to what Wittgenstein was talking about in his discussion of the word “game”, and another
type, examples of which are the “semantically poor” expressions with which natural language is replete,
and without which ordinary human communication is difficult to imagine. Since we have already
discussed Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the first type, involving efficient imprecision with semantically rich
lexical items, I will focus on drawing distinguishing between the two types and discussing the second type
in detail.
To summarize briefly Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Investigations: A word like “game” is used
on a daily basis by all fluent speakers of a language, and almost never is the correctness of their
employment of the word called into question within the normal range of linguistic situations in which the
term might be plausibly applied. But when presented with a borderline case, or asked to provide an exact,
or, as we have been saying, L-precise, definition or delimitation of the meaning of the word “game”, we
find it almost impossible to do so. Note that, while we could categorize a multiplicity of restricted, exact
uses of the word “game”, the crucial point is that we cannot give an exact definition of the whole usage of
the term “game” in our language; this is exactly what the technical notion of L-precision was meant to

capture. In addition, we would explain the meaning of the word “game” to someone unfamiliar with that
term by showing him or her examples of particular games; their connection is established, not by an exact
definition of the word, but on the basis of something like a “family resemblance”.
The second type of efficient imprecision might even be called the “strong” case, and the first type
the “weak” case; for there appear to be words which are extremely common in our ordinary language for
which we are not only unprepared to provide a definition that would render the term L-precise, but for
which it is difficult to say what sort of definition we would want to try to provide.
On almost any page of any ancient Greek text you are likely to find the word γε. It is one of the
most common words in the language; but even professional scholars have a difficult time stating what it
means. Its entry in Liddell and Scott’s venerable Greek-English Lexicon is more of a catalog of contexts
in which it is attested in the literature than a delimitation of its possible meanings, which is an essential
characteristic of definitions of efficiently imprecise terms. It is generally understood as adding emphasis
to a word or phrase or contrasting it with another word, phrase, sentence, or entire context of discourse.
Obviously, like articles, demonstratives and indexicals, it has no reference of its own; but words like ge, it
seems, are different even from these words in that they do not contribute in any way to either the
extensional or the intensional information content of the sentence. The definite article, for instance,
provides information that helps in fixing the reference (extension) of the singular or general term it is
associated with. In the sentence “The man with brown hair is getting married”, the definite article is used
like a quantifier, informing the listener as to how many men with brown hair are under discussion. If we
had said “A man with brown hair is getting married”, then we could be talking about any man; the
indefinite article can be translated by the existential quantifier. But when we use a word only to
emphasize or draw a contrast, we have contributed nothing to the reference (extension) of the sentence
with this word; its use doesn’t belong to the activity of picking out or describing objects in the world.
Nor, however, does it seem to add to the pure conceptual content (intension) of a word, phrase, or

sentence. An English analogue is “very”, as in the sentence “This is the very heart of the matter”. It seems
intuitively obvious that the conceptual content of this sentence is the same as that of “This is the heart of
the matter”, without the word “very”. Words like English “very” or Greek γε seem in some way to be
more of a piece with the rest of our behavioral apparatus, like saying part of a sentence louder to
emphasize it; but they clearly function like ordinary words in other ways. They are involved in syntactic
structure, they can scope over different parts of a sentence like modal operators, and, most importantly,
they intuitively seem to mean something; they signify, meaning, they behave like signs. But they do not
contribute anything to either the extensional or intensional properties of their linguistic context; therefore,
in relation to what would we purport to define their meaning? While words like “game” seem to be
resistant to definition in practice, “semantically poor” words seem in principle undefinable.

Conclusion

Are we, in general, conscious of our language-using activity as something that is necessarily
either precise or imprecise? It is sometimes much more intuitive to think of our language-behavior as of a
piece with the rest of our behavioral apparatus. If we could somehow know that somebody who was
crying out in pain was not really in pain, we would not say that he was being inexact, but that he was
faking it. Exactness or inexactness does not enter into it. Likewise, semantically poor words like Greek γε
and English “very”, “rather”, and even “but” (which, of course, is not translatable as a logical connective)
have a performative component--the behavioral context in which they occur, the speaker’s emphasizing a
contrast, constitutes in some sense their correct use. Perhaps this is how language works in general? It is
often said that words do not properly refer, only denote; a word can be used by a speaker to refer. But
what exactly does denotation, often construed as the “stable” part of a word’s meaning, then come to,
other than simply what a word is overwhelmingly most commonly used to refer to?

Since, however, regimented languages do in fact exist, such as the languages of mathematics,
logic and theoretical physics, where, for instance, as Quine noted in his book Word and Object, we could
not specify any condition for knowing what a neutrino (a theoretical entity in particle physics) is beyond
understanding the theoretical language in which it is used, it appears that language exists along a
spectrum, with the conception of language as a sort of regimented picture of a regimented reality at one
end, and as of a piece with the rest of our behavioral repertoire at the other end. Words that exhibit
efficient imprecision, I conclude, are located somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. They have
meaning and reference, but their usage, as we saw above, does not have to be amenable to regimentation
in order for us to use them; therefore, they seem to have characteristics of both descriptive language and
the behavioral apparatus. And this seems to comport with how we acquire language, which, it should be
remembered, we do our whole lives: much of language we learn by observing the environment and
behavioral context in which others use them, but there is also a lot of language, such as the technical
languages of exact sciences, which we can only learn by engaging with it as quasi-regimented and a
picture of a reality that is also in some sense regimented to fit the language.
I believe that the conception of language I have advanced--thinking of language as a flexible,
equipotent faculty, capable of performing the functions we intuitively associate with both formalized
language and the activity inherent in ordinary discourse, depending on our needs--can clarify and preempt
many potential confusions for philosophers, linguists and cognitive scientists.

